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Ann. ,

Section

78-.?

applied

by

the

trial

court,

are

unconstitutionally

overbroad to the extent that the procedural provisions of
the

Act

serve

to

limit

claims

against

a

special

classification, as opposed the achievement of the stated
legislative

intent to

"provide other procedural

changes

to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.''
State v. Framoton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987); Berrv bv and
through

Berrv

1985).

[R. 157-161, 163, 204-205, 257, pp. 19-20, 23,

27-31.]

A

v.

challenge

statute

presents
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rulings

Rvan

v.

Beech

Gold

only
are

Cross

Aircraft.

to

the

P.2d

670

(Utah

constitutionality

questions
accorded

717

of

law, and

no particular

Servs. . Inc.,

903

of

the

a

trial

deference.

P.2d

423

(Utah

1995); Mountain Fuel SUTDOIV v. Salt Lake Citv, 752

P.2d

884, 887 (Utah 1988).
III.
rights

Whether

under

or not

Article

I,

the plaintiffs'
sections

2, 7,

constitutional
11 and

24

and

Article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
were
R156,

violated

by

(1)

Utah

Administrative

Rules,

Rule

(2) the Division's action in deciding not to open

2

and process a file with regard to the Notice of Intent
and

Petition,

(3)

the Division's

failure to provide

notice to parties of its decision and actions, and

(4)

such other action of the Division as should be required
by Utah Code Ann. , Sections 78-14-2 and 78-14-12 so as to
not

make

Utah

unconstitutionally

Code

Ann. ,

overbroad

and

Section
to

78-14-12

otherwise

avoid

arbitrarily depriving the plaintiff's of their rights of
due process and access to the courts.
737 P.2d

183

State v. Frampton,

(Utah 1987); Berrv bv and through Berrv v.

Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Soackman Ex Rel
Soackman v. Bd. Of Educ. , 16 P. 3d 533 (Utah 2000); Morris
v. Public Service Commission, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah).
157-161, 163, 204-205, 257, pp. 19-20, 23, 27-31.]
respect
law,

to an appeal

[R.
With

which presents only questions

of

the trial court's rulings are accorded no deference

and are reviewed for correctness.

Mountain Fuel

v. Salt Lake Citv, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988).
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-12.
Utah Administrative Code, Rules R156-78A.

3

Supply

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The

above-captioned

negligence

action

and wrongful

involves

death

against

claims

medical

of
care

providers of Norma Mary Harriman.
Following filing
Court,

the

considered

case

of

was

outside

the action

dismissed.

the

in Third

District

Based

on

the

trial

pleadings,

matters
court

addressed the matter under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 56 as a motion for

summary judgment.

The

trial

court found that i t did not have jurisdiction over the
case as a consequence of

the provisions

Health Care Malpractice Act (the

w

of

the Utah

Act").

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Norma Mary Harriman died on or about March 3, 1999.
On or about February 14, 2001, her heirs filed a Notice
of

Intent

Intent")

to Commence Legal
and a Petition

*Petition")
Licensing

with

the

for

Utah

(the "Division")

Action

(the

"Notice

of

Prelitigation

Review

Division

Occupational

pursuant

of

to the Act.

(the

The

Notice of Intent was sent by certified mail to all of the

4

applicable medical care providers.

The Petition was not

sent to the named parties, as none of them had yet been
served in the action with the Division.

[R. 26-35.]

No action was taken by the Division.

[R. 73-75.]

The Division made a conscious decision (1) not to notify
the parties of the opening of a file relative to the
Notice of Intent, (2) not to notify the parties that it
had not received a copy of the Petition (or that it was
lost), (3) not to notify the parties of any requirements
of maintaining the action commenced by the filing of the
Notice of Intent,

(4) not to notify the parties of its

decision to close the action commenced by the filing of
the Notice of Intent, and (5) and not to provide for any
remedy

or

procedure

associated

with

the

foregoing,

whether by including the same in Rule R156-78A of the
Utah Administrative Rules or informally, so as not to
arbitrarily fail to accomplish the intent of Utah Code
Ann., section 78-14-2

or Rule

R156-78A

to provide

a

process to "expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims," which is the only role of the Division and the

5

only purpose of filing a Notice of Intent or Petition.
[R. 73-75, ]
The plaintiffs

filed an action in Third District

Court on June 13, 2001, alleging negligence and wrongful
death against the medical care providers.
At
Court

the hearing held December 19, 2001, the Trial
held

that

the

failure

to mail a

copy of

the

Petition to the named defendants deprived the Trial Court
of Jurisdiction.

[R. 257.] Pursuant to said decision, on

February 4, 2002, the Trial Court executed an Order of
Dismissal.

[R. 245-48.] Notice of Appeal was filed March

4, 2002. [R. 249-50.]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When a case falls under the Act, the courts in the
state of Utah are not thereby deprived of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction with the Division is concurrent, until the
jurisdiction of the Division is expires pursuant to Act.
As

a

condition

precedent

to

commencement

of

litigation, a plaintiff must file a notice on intent to
commence legal action and request a prelitigation panel
review with the Division.

Minor defects in the form of

6

the request for prelitigation panel review do not deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction, and the Act actually
provides that upon the expiration of the jurisdiction of
the Division under the conditions of the present case
that

all

prelitigation

requirement

shall

be

deemed

satisfied.
The stated purpose of the prelitigation panel review,
as stated by the Act, is

u

to provide other procedural

changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims." Utah Code Ann., section 78-14-2.

To the extent

that the Act has been interpreted by the trial court as a
mechanism to limit the filing of lawsuits against health
care providers, the Act is unconstitutional because its
effect is to deprive a classification of equal access to
the

courts

and because

it

deprives claimants of due

process in certain circumstances.
Plaintiffs are entitled to constitutional protections
in the administration of their claims by the Division.
The Division deprived the plaintiffs in this case of
their

rights

to due process

courts.

7

and equal access to the

ARGUMENT
I,

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION,

The d i s t r i c t courts have j u r i s d i c t i o n over claims of
n e g l i g e n c e and wrongful death p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann.,
S e c t i o n 78-3-4.
on t h e

Nothing in the Act s t a t e s any l i m i t a t i o n

jurisdiction

Supreme

Court

of

has

the d i s t r i c t

held

that

exercise that jurisdiction,
technicalities
anticipated
(Utah

in

the

fashion.

the

The Utah

district

court

even when c e r t a i n

Act

are

not

See Avila

1990) ( D i s t r i c t

courts.

court

had

v.

procedural

followed
Winn,

may

in

the

794 P. 2d 20

jurisdiction

in

action

f i l e d p r i o r to completion of p r e l i t i g a t i o n panel review) .
With

respect

to

medical m a l p r a c t i c e
identified

(at

the

prerequisites

lawsuit,

least

in

for

the

appellate

dicta)

three

courts

face

dismissal

of

V a l l e y Memorial

HOSP.

2 00 0 ) ;

,

Avila

the a c t i o n .
, 996 P.2d

Carter
1076,

s u p r a ; Allen v .

Care, I n c . , 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981).

8

a

have

requirements

p r o v i d e d by the Act with which t h e p l a i n t i f f
or

filing

1079

must comply
v.

Milford

(Utah App.

Intermountain

Health

First, the plaintiff must file a notice of intent to
commence legal action (the "Notice") and serve a copy on
the applicable health care providers.
Ann. , Section 78-14-8.
defendants

was

See Utah

Code

It is undisputed that each of the

served with

the

notice

of

intent

to

commence an action and that the notice was filed with the
Division of February 14, 2001.
Second,

the

plaintiff

[R. 29-32.]
must

prelitigation panel review

file

a

request

(the "Request") .

Code Ann., Section 78-14-12(2).

for

See Utah

The trial court found a

question of fact as to whether or not the Request had
been filed by the plaintiff.
consideration

of evidence

[R. 245.] As a result of

outside

the pleadings, the

trial court addressed the matter pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, or in other words construing
the matter as though the Request had been filed. Under
circumstances where the Division convenes a prelitigation
panel, the plaintiff must submit to the review by the
panel.
Utah

See Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-12(1); but see
Code

Ann. ,

Section

7 8 - 14 - 12 ( 3 ) (b) ( ii )

prelitigation panel procedures not completed within 180

9

(if

days of Request, then
complied

with

all

xx

the claimant is considered to have

conditions

this section prior

precedent

to the commencement

required

under

of litigation").

The Division did not convene a prelitigation panel, and
the plaintiff was thereby released from such requirement
pursuant

to Utah

Code Ann. , Section 78-14-12(3) (b) (ii) .

Moreover, as a result of the failure of the Division to
timely complete

the prelitigation panel review process,

plaintiffs

"considered

are

to

have

complied

with

all

conditions precedent required under this section prior to
the commencement of litigation." Id.
Third, the plaintiff must file the complaint with the
district court within the abbreviated two-year statute of
limitations period.

Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-4. The

complaint must be filed at least 90 days after service of
the Notice.

Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-8.

is undisputed

Again, it

that the complaint was timely filed.

The

only dispute among the parties related to the Request.
Based on the foregoing, it can only be concluded that
the

trial

court

trial court

had

had

jurisdiction

the discretion

10

to

in

the action.

The

either proceed with

litigation or to provide the parties with an opportunity
for a prelitigation panel review before proceeding, or
otherwise address the circumstances of the parties.
The trial court's finding that it had no jurisdiction
because the Request was not mailed to the defendants at
the time of filing was reversible error.

The trial court

took its decision from the language of the Act provided
by

Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-12 (2) (b) , which states

in part, "The request shall be mailed to all health care
providers named in the notice and request." There is no
basis

to conclude

jurisdictional.

that

such

provision

is by

itself

As stated above, Utah Code Ann., Section

78-14-12 (3) (b) (ii) renders the question moot.

The only

relevant question is whether the Request was filed with
the Division.
The parties refer to Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-1412(1) (c) for the proposition that
informal,

nonbinding,

...

but

"The proceedings are
are

compulsory

as

a

condition precedent to commencing litigation." Yet, this
provision refers to the conduct of proceedings arranged
by the Division in response to a Request and not to the

11

technical accuracy of issues such as mailing the Request.
Section

78-14-12 (3) (b) (ii)

technicalities
legislative

are not

intent

of

clearly

implies

that

jurisdictional.

Moreover,

the

is

proceedings

such

stated

the
in

Section 78-14-2 as "to provide other procedural changes
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims."
The implementing rules similarly provide in

R156-78A-

4(1),

shall

"Liberal

liberally

Construction.

construed

to

secure

economical determination of all

These
the

rules

just,

be

speedy and

issues presented to the

division. " The purpose of the statute and rules is not to
limit medical malpractice claims through a mechanism that
allows the Division to deprive claimants of their due
process

rights.

Utah Code Ann.,

Section 78-14-12(1)

makes i t the responsibility of the Division to promulgate
rules to achieve the purposes stated.

This Court has

jurisdiction to find that either the appropriate rules or
procedures are not in place or that the Division did not
otherwise act as they should.
trial

court's

interpretation

12

As discussed below, the
of

the purpose

of

the

statute

as

a

mechanism

for

limiting

claims

is

an

unconstitutional interpretation.
Because the trial court has jurisdiction, appellants
respectfully

request

that

the

order dismissing

their

claims be reversed and that the matter be remanded to the
trial court to determine how to proceed with reference to
litigation and/or convening of a prelitigation panel.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE ACT
VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS.

The Utah Constitution provides guarantees in wrongful
death cases, open access to the court for all citizens,
equal protection and due process*

Utah Constitution, and

Article I, sections 2, 7, 11 and 24 and Article XVI,
section 5-

Similar due process rights are guaranteed by

the

and

Fifth

Fourteenth

Amendments

of

the

U.S.

Constitution.
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution is
generally

referred

to as the

"open courts" provision.

Berrv bv and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d
670, 674 (Utah 1985).

Among the purposes of Section 11

is the guaranty of "access to the courts and a judicial

13

procedure based on fairness and equality."
To satisfy

the

Constitution,

open

courts

id. at 675.

provision

of

the

Utah

legislation must be substantially equal in

value or benefit to any remedy abrogated.
no substitute

remedy is

provided,

.Id. at 680. If

abrogation

of

the

remedy can only be justified if there is a clear social
evil

to be eliminated and elimination

of

an

existing

legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of
achieving the objective.

Id. at 680.

Defining the scope

of Section 11 requires careful consideration of related
constitutional
provided

by

Constitution.
limitation
providers
political

issues,
Article

such as
1,

Section

Ld. at 680.

on powerful
and

of
7

due process

of

the

Utah

These protections impose a

groups,

insurance

those

such

companies,

as

medical

from

using

care
the

process to limit the rights of other groups.

See Id. at 676.
Article XVI, section 5, of the Utah Constitution is
intended to prevent abolition of the right of action for
wrongful

death,

fashion.

Id.

either
at

684.

in

a wholesale

Application
14

of

or

piecemeal

Section

5 is

considerably more strict that the application of Section
IcL at 683. 1 Restrictions which limit the ability of

11.

a party to effectively pursue a remedy for wrongful death
is "beyond legislative authority."
action

is

beyond

legislative

id. at 684.

authority,

If such

then

it

is

certainly beyond the authority of the Division, under the
guise

of

legislative

authority,

to

produce

the

same

effect.
Another
substantive

related
due

constitutional

process,

issue

guaranteed

by

involves
the

Utah

Constitution, and Article I, section 7 and by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

A

statute may be overbroad in its application, and violate
the interests of substantive due process, if its effect
is to limit rights beyond an intended legitimate purpose.
See e.g. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d

183, 191-192

(Utah

1987) .

1

See Berry bv and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft,
717 P. 2d 670, 683-85 for a discussion of statutes declared
unconstitutional or constitutional with reference to
Article XVI, section 5.

15

All of the foregoing rights do not depend upon or
defer to the legislature, but must be upheld as resting
upon constitutional
legislature.
Educ . , 16

See
P.3d

authority

that

is supreme to the

STDackman Ex Rel Spackman v. Bd. Of
533,

535-36

(Utah

2000)

(Article I,

Section 7 is self executing clause) .
At

the

hearing

specifically

stated,

in

question,

"Well,

but

the

trial

see,

the

court

rules

of

procedure really don't apply, do they?

There are some

standards

or wrong, has

decided

that
to

providers.
don't,

the

give

legislature,

special

right

treatment

to

health

care

Whether you disagree with that or whether you

it's

the

law, and

the Supreme

Court says its

constitutional, so you have got to jump through all of
these hoops.

It is like the notice on the governmental

immunity act.

There are certain things that you have got

to do."
The governmental immunity act, referred to the by the
trial court, is a statute which provides parties with a
right to sue certain government institutions in certain
cases.

Rather than limiting the rights of individuals to

16

commence l i t i g a t i o n ,

i t creates a right of action when

certain requirement are met.
serves

as

a limitation

The Act, on the other hand,

on actions.

It

must have a

purpose other than the arbitrary limitation of access to
the courts of

a certain classification

The legislature
stated

that

review,

as

procedural

certainly

the

purpose

discussed
changes

understood
of

the

above,

to

plaintiffs.

this

when they

prelitigation

was

expedite

of

u

to

provide

early

panel
other

evaluation and

settlement of claims" and not to limit actions against
health

care

providers

limitations imposed.

except

by

the

statute

of

The only limitation against filing

actions which is provided by the Act that the Courts have
confirmed is constitutional
limitations.

See Allen, supra.

The t r i a l

court further

construction of
make sense.
lawsuits
statute

is the two-year statute of

demonstrated its erroneous

the Act when i t

If

stated,

the purpose of i t

is

"That doesn't

to avoid filing

then why are we allowing-then why does the
allow

filing

lawsuits

in

the

middle of

the

prelitigation panel process." Again, the stated purpose
17

of the procedures

involved in the prelitigation panel

review process is to expedite the discussion of issues,
not prevent Plaintiffs from going forward.
The Act provides no remedy to a plaintiff, only a
non-binding forum for discussion of claims.

If a purpose

of the Act is to eliminate lawsuits against providers of
medical

care,

then

the Act

cannot

stand.

Lawsuits

against negligent parties is not an evil to be eliminated
in

society,

but

is instead and

important

remedy

injuries, particularly in wrongful death cases.
other hand,

if the purpose of the Act is

u

for

On the

to provide

other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and
settlement of claims," then the purpose is appropriate as
long as the process does not have the unconstitutional
effect of depriving parties of the right to bring an
action in court, and as long as the Division and the
courts adopt rules and administer the process with the
purpose of
mind.

early evaluation and settlement of claims in

If rules are adopted or administered, or if the

Act is interpreted, in a fashion that eliminates claims
without

appropriate remedies for circumstances-18

even

oversights — that may arise, then the effect

of

the Act

becomes unconstitutional.
In other words, any provision of the Act that were to
make s t r i c t
Request

compliance with

jurisdictional,

filing
would

and mailing

the

constitute

an

unconstitutional limitation on due process and access to
the

courts

for

plaintiffs.

the

applicable

classification

of

Unless the Act is interpreted in the manner

suggested by the Appellants in this action, as requiring
the

Division

and permitting

the

court

to

convene a

prelitigation panel when a filing is lost or in the event
of

some

other

irregularity,

then

the

Act

is

unconstitutional.
In the present case, the circumstances involve the
timely filing of the Notice with the Division, a Request
which was
Division,

filed

with the Division

and

lost

and a Complaint that was timely filed

District Court.

by

the

in the

The constitutional issues raised by the

Appellants must be resolved in favor of permitting the
Appellants to go forward as plaintiffs in this action.
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The constitutionality of the Act as a limitation on
the right of access to

the courts, as well

as

the due

process arguments concerning the Division addressed both
above and below, are matters of first impression before
this Court.2
Ill,
An

THE DIVISION VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS.

act

by

a

administrative

body

which

is

taken

without notice to affected parties violates due process.
Morris v. Public Service Commission, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah).
The Division

has

a

responsibility

file a Notice and/or Request.

to parties

that

First, the Division has

2 Carter, supra, considered the interpretation of the
term "health care provider" in the Act. Avila, supra,
considered whether the district court had jurisdiction
with regard to a prematurely filed complaint where
irregularities existed with respect to the request for
prelitigation panel review and the completion of such
proceedings. The principles of estoppel in Avila,
however, do have some application in the present case to
the plaintiffs' reliance on the Division's silence. In
Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1992) the Court
addressed the necessity of filing an action within 60 days
following the service of the Notice. The Court did not
consider the necessity of a prelitigation panel review,
under a prior version of the statute, because it held that
the issue was precluded by collateral estoppel. In Allen,
supra, the Court only addressed the constitutionality of a
two year statute of limitations.
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been given

the authority

and responsibility

to adopt

rules implementing the Act in order to achieve the stated
See Utah Code Ann. . Section 78-14-

purposes of the Act.
12(1).

As discussed above, the purpose of the role
u

played by the Division is

to provide other procedural

changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims."
In

the

present

case,

the

rules

adopted

by

the

Division are inadequate to protect the due process rights
of claimants and their right of access to the courts.
Even to the extent that the rules were adequate at some
level,

the policies

described

in

the

and

conduct

affidavit

prelitigation coordinator

of

of

the

Adele

Division, as
Bancroft,

the

for the Division, dated July

30, 2001, are not being followed so as to protect the
constitutional rights of claimants.

[R. 73-75.]

Ms. Bancroft's affidavit seems to indicate that, as
actually occurred in the present case, the Division has
no procedure whatsoever

for notification

to claimants

with regard to deficiencies in a file, including lost
filings.

She states,

21

8. If the Division had received a Request which was
deficient for some reason, such as the failure to
submit the approved fee, the Division would have
denied the Request and would have a record of such
denial.
9. Because a Request was not filed with the
Division and the required filing fee was not
submitted to the Division, no action was taken or
required to be taken by the Division in this matter,
and no prelitigation review was approved.
In her

letter, dated July 12, 2001, Ms. Bancroft

further stated,

u

It is my policy to hold any Notice of

Intent to Commence Legal Action that are received without
the proper accompanying documents for 60 days.
appropriate

Request

and

filing

fee are not

within that time, the matter is considered

If the
received

"dead" and

filed."
Ms. Bancroft makes no reference to any notice or due
process procedures involving notification to the parties.3

3 The court should note that Ms. Bancroft had no
personal knowledge concerning the filing of the Request.
Ms. Bancroft was not the person at the in-take desk who
received the request for appointment of a pre-litigation
panel. She cannot testify about what happened to the
request after it was filed, unless she testifies that she
knows what happened to the document in question. Without
an affidavit from the person who did the in-take, there
was no one to counter the affidavit of Thor B. Roundy
stating that the document in question was filed.
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There appears to be nothing contained in any procedure
that Ms. Bancroft follows aimed at achieving the purpose
of providing "other procedural changes to expedite early
evaluation
appears

and

that

settlement

she

sees

of

claims."

the role

of

the

Instead,

it

Division

as

creating a process barrier to the subsequent filing of
litigation.

She has adopted her own personal policy for

handling filings she considers incomplete.
As another example, Utah Administrative Code R15678A-7(1) permits the Division to reject pleadings if they
are not filed in accordance with the requirements of the
rules promulgated under the Act.
Code,

Rule

R156-78A-9(2)

Utah Administrative

addresses

the

division's

discretion to reject a petition if it is not mailed to
all healthcare providers named therein.
case,

the

Request.

Division

never

rejected

In the present
the

Plaintiffs'

The Division's failure to reject the Request

constitutes

the Division's acceptance and

affirmation

that the petition was acceptable and should have been
processed appropriately.

However, nothing contained in

Rule R156-78A assures the existence of due process or
23

notice.
essential

The courts clearly recognize such provisions as
to the just administration

example, the Utah Rules of Civil
provides

the

court with

broad

of claims.

For

Procedure, Rule 60,

discretion

to

address

procedural oversights, whether caused by the courts or by
the parties and their representatives.
it would be very difficult

to

Without Rule 60,

imagine

the

fair

and

equitable administration of the courts.
Finally, there is clearly no provision in the rules
which provides safeguards

for

lost filings, notice to

claimants of the status of their matter, expectations of
the Division with regard to delays or irregularities in
processing, and so forth.

The present case illustrates

how the constitutional rights of claimants are violated
by the absence of such provisions and/or the manner in
which the Division has chosen to consciously ignore such
rights in favor of limiting actions against health care
providers instead of providing "other procedural changes
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims."
The trial court ignored

the constitutional

issues

such as due process raised by the divisions' failure to
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give the plaintiffs notice to the extent that there was a
rejection of the Request.

The trial court also ignored

the failure of the Division to adopt and implement rules
that achieved the legislative purpose of providing uother
procedural

changes

to

expedite

early

evaluation

and

settlement of claims . "
CONCLUSION
Based

on the

respectfully

foregoing

request

that

arguments,
this

Court

the
issue

appellants
an

Order

declaring the trial court to have jurisdiction over the
action, and directing the trial court either to proceed
with the litigation of the matter pursuant to the Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

or

to

order

review

by a

prelitigation panel, with specific requirement that the
plaintiffs be afforded appropriate due process remedies
for the loss of the Request filed with the Division.
DATED this J*

day of July, 2002.

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
Thor B. Roundy
340 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Bar No. 6435

fr*

I, THOR B. ROUNDY, certify that on this
/*
day of
July, 2002, I served a copy of the attached BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANTS, Trial Court No. 010905108, Appellate Court
No. 20020204-SC, upon counsel for the appellees in this
matter by mailing two copies to each of them by first
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the
following address:
JoAnn E. Carnahan
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE
1400 Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Robert G. Wright
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
7th Floor Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Richard W. Campbell
CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellants
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN PHILLIPS Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MINUTE ENTRY

vs.

Case No: 010905108 WD

JOHN DOES 1-50 Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
December 19, 2001

evelynt

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s) : THOR B ROUNDY
Defendant's Attorney(s) : PAUL D VAN KOMEN
ROBERT G WRIGHT
Other Parties: DAVID FERENCE
Video
Tape Number:
12/19/01
Tape Count: 9:07/10:06

HEARING
This case is before the Court for oral argument on defendants'
motions to dismiss. Appearances as shown above.
Counsel present arguments to the Court.
The matter is submitted.
Based upon documents submitted, and arguments of counsel, the
Court rules as follows:
The Court will consider the motions' as Rule 56 motions in
accordance with the rules of civil procedure, and consider the
supporting documents in connection thereof.
Based upon arguments of counsel, the Court finds a question of
fact on the issue of file of a Pre-litigation Panel Request, the
failure to pay filing fees is not dispositive.
Plaintiff acknowledges their failure to to mail the request for
Pre-litigation Panel to all the health care providers.
Accordingly this Court has no jurisdiction, and the Court is
compeled to dismiss the case, based upon failure to plaintiff to
comply with the statute, and legislative mandate.
Page 1

Case No: 010905108
Date:
Dec 19, 2001
Defendant's counsel is to prepare findings of facts and
conclusions of law, and an order consistent with the Court's
ruling.

Page 2 (last)

JoAnn E. Carnahan (#5262)
Paul D. Van Komen (#7332)
BURBIDGE. CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE,
Attorneys for Defendants McKay-Dee Hospital Center
and Intermountain Health Care. Inc.
1400 Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 359-7000

FILED 0ISTUCT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB - 4 2002
;.»

SALTLARfil/COUNTY

J
CMputrClerfc

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN LABELLE, SHEILA CARLSON,
LINDA BUCKLEY and MARILYN
PHILLIPS, individuals and as heirs of Norma
Mary Harriman,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL CENTER,
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.,
Utah corporations, DR. IVAN D. WRIGHT,
DR. HAROLD VONK and DR. RONALD S.
RANKIN, individuals, and JOHN DOES 150.

Case No. 010905108
Honorable Timothy Hanson

Defendants

The Court on December 19,2001 heard argument on the defendants' Motions to Dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs were represented by Thor B. Roundy; defendants McKayDee Hospital Center and Intermountain Health Care, Inc. were represented by Paul D. Van
Komen; Ivan D. Wright. M.D. was represented by Robert G. Wright; and defendants Harold
Vonk. M.D. and Ronald S. Rankin, M.D. were represented by John David Ference. The Court,

having heard oral argument from counsel and having reviewed and considered the memoranda
and affidavits submitted by the parties, finds as follows:
1.

Because matters outside the pleading were presented and considered by the Court,

the motions to dismiss were treated as motions for summary judgment under Rule 12(b) and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56.
2.

The Court finds that a question of fact exists regarding whether a request for

prelitigation panel review was 'Tiled" with the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.
3.

However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that neither the plaintiffs nor their

counsel complied with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for
prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and
request/' In light of the plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of the health
care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed to comply with the statutory requirements
which "'are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation."
4.

The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no jurisdiction based on the

legislative mandates set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-141 et seq.
5.

Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing

litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because
the plaintiffs* action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction and is
compelled to dismiss plaintiffs* complaint.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs
-?.

did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent to commencing litigation and therefore the
defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the above-entitled action against the
defendants SHALL BE AND IS HEREBY DISMISSEE)/
DATED this

v day of _

Timothy Hans<
District Court

- j -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the H__ day of January. 2002.1 caused to be served by the method
indicated beiovv a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing proposed ORDER OF
DISMISSAL to the following:

K
K_

K

2L

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Thor B. Roundy
275 East South Temple. Suite 150
Salt Lake Cirv. Utah 84111

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Robert G. Wright
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson
700 Key Bank Tower. 50 South Mam Street
P O. Box 2465
Salt Lake Ciry. Utah 84110

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Richard Campbell
Campbell & Campbell
2485 Grant Ave. =^200
Oaden Utah. 84401
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TITLE 78, CHAPTER 14
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
78-14-1. Short title of act.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act."
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose of act.
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and
the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has substantially
increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care
providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's
practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a
lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide
services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse
effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care system, it is
necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage
private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance
while at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in
the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable
time in which actions may be commenced against health care providers while limiting that
time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite
early evaluation and settlement of claims.
78-14-3. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under Title 58,
Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act.
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a certified
social worker under Section 58-60-305.
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic under
Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act.
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a clinical
social worker under Section 58-60-305.
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided in Section
31A-2-102.
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental hygiene as defined
in Section 58-69-102.
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in Section
58-69-102.
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing created
in Section 58-1-103.
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, care or custody,
loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering of the
judgment creditor.
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which
should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf
of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement.
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association,
corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who renders
health care or professional services as a hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric physician,
psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician,
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical
social worker, certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family
counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and services
relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and
officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in "the course and scope of their

employment.
(12) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under Title 26,
Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection Act.
(13) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a licensed
practical nurse as provided in Section 58-31b-301.
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action against a
health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or
otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider.
(15) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to practice as a
marriage therapist or family therapist under Section 58-60-405.
(16) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice naturopathy as
defined in Section 58-71-102.
(17) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as a nurse
midwife under Section 58-44a-302 or 58-44a-305.
(18) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under Title 58,
Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry Practice Act.
(19) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice osteopathy under
Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care provider, under
a contract, express or implied.
(21) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as provided in
Section 58-17a-301.
(22) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy under
Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice Act.
*(23) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under
Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act.
(24) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry under Title
58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing Act.
(25) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician
in this state under Title 58 f Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or under Title 58,
Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(26) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, Psychologist
Licensing Act, to practice psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102.
(27) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional nursing as
provided in Section 58-31b-301.
(28) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact,
or other legal agent of the patient.
(29) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a social service
worker under Section 58-60-305.
(30) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person Licensed to practice
speech-language pathology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and
Audiology Licensing Act.
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or
omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.
78-14-4. Statute of limitations - Exceptions - Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to
exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence,
except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a
foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object
wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent
concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and

lall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and
) all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against health care providers
ised upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this
:t; provided, however, that any action which under former law could have been commenced
:ter the effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of
.me allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could have been
)mmenced more than four years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only
.thin four years after the effective date of this act.
1-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff
No reduction where subrogation right exists - Collateral sources defined - Procedure to
reserve subrogation rights - Evidence admissible - Exceptions.
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers as defined in Section
1-14-3 in which damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the
>urt shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts paid to the
.aintiff from all collateral sources which are available to him; however, there shall be
) reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists as provided in
lis section nor shall there be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the
/ard of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of
ict, the court shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts of collateral sources
lich have been paid to or for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to
.m. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which has been paid, contributed,
forfeited by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his immediate family to
icure his right to any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his
ijury, and shall offset any reduction in the award by such amounts. No evidence shall be
iceived and no reduction made with respect to future collateral source benefits except as
>ecified in Subsection (4).
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means payments made to or for
le benefit of the plaintiff for:
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable under the United States Social
icurity Act, any federal, state, or local income disability act, or any other public
ogram, except the federal programs which are required by law to seek subrogation;
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability insurance, automobile accident
isurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any other
milar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the plaintiff,
lether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others;
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership, or
>rporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or
her health care services, except benefits received as gifts, contributions, or
sistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any
her system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to settlement
judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 days before
ttlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health care provider against
om the malpractice action has been asserted. The written notice shall state the name and
dress of the provider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral sources paid, the
mes and addresses of all persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for
ich payment has been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments or benefits
ailable in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available
respective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood
at such programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the future is also
missible. The trier of fact may consider such evidence in determining the amount of
mages awarded to a plaintiff for future expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of such
nefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or entity as
imbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment,
eluding any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 19, except to the extent that
brogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as
ovided in this section. All policies of insurance providing benefits affected by this
ction are construed in accordance with this section.
-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent - Proof required of patient - Defenses nsent to health care.

(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it shall
be presumed that what the health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly
authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider in an
action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must
prove the following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and health care
provider;
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient;
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered;
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of
causing the patient serious harm;
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented
to the health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to
the decision to give consent. In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the
patient's position would do under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the
viewpoint of the patient before health care was provided and "before the occurrence of any
personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of
personal injuries suffered by the patient.
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care provider
based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was relatively
minor;
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider was
commonly known to the public;
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of, that he
would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or that he did not want to
pe informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed;
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts and
circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were
disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably believed that additional disclosures
could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which sets forth
the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which contains a declaration that
the patient accepts the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, in hopes of
obtaining desired beneficial results of health care and which acknowledges that health
care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a
satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant
risks have«been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his representative;
such written consent shall be a defense to an action against a health care provider based
upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving
the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing proof that the
execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's affirmative acts of
fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent any person 18 years
of age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his own person upon personal or
religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any health care
not prohibited by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally serving or
not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for his ward;
(d) any person 18 years of age or over for his or her parent who is unable by reason
of age, physical or mental condition, to provide such consent;
(e) any patient 18 years of age or over;
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with
her pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother or sister; and
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grandchild.
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or
procedures for another as provided by this act shall be subject to civil liability.
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty,

contract or assurance of result.
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an alleged
breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be obtained from any
health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set forth in
writing and signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent of the provider.
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint.
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a
malpractice action against a health care provider. The complaint shall merely pray for
such damages as are reasonable in the premises.
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic damages in malpractice actions.
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may
recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In no
case shall the amount of damages awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000. This
limitation does not affect awards of punitive damages.
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action.
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in Section
78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a client seeking
damages in connection with or arising out of personal injury or wrongful death caused by
the negligence of another which exceeds 331/3% of the amount recovered.
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement,
arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal is involved.
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless and until
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least
ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a
general statement of the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and
place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on
the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other
damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons and
complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in which case
notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be
served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health care
provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the
applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health
care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as
relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to
causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall not apply to third
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care provider.
78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers - Insurance commissioner
nay require joint underwriting authority.
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of this state any
Drofessional liability insurance coverage for health care providers is not readily
available in the voluntary market, and that the public interest requires, he may by
regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide insurance coverage through all
insurers issuing professional liability policies and individual and group accident and
sickness policies providing medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a
Drepaid or an expense incurred basis, including personal injury protection and medical
expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies.
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damages in malpractice actions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's damages for future medical
:reatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
Dain and suffering.
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of other property to

the judgment creditor at such intervals as ordered by the court.
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, as defined in Section
78-14-3, the court shall, at the request of any party, order that future damages which
equal or exceed $100,000, less amounts p a y a b l e for attorney's fees and other costs which
are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by periodic payments rather than by a lump
sum payment.
(3) In rendering a judgment which o r d e r s the payment of future damages by periodic
payments, the court shall order periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between
the sustaining of losses and the payment of damages. Lost future earnings shall be paid
over the judgment creditor's work life expectancy. The court shall also order, when
appropriate, that periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the rate of
inflation which the finder of fact used to determine the amount of future damages, or as
measured by the most recent Consumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and
services. The present cash value of all p e r i o d i c payments shall equal the fact finder's
award of future damages, less any amount p a i d for attorney's fees and costs. The present
cash value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting the total amount of
periodic payments projected over the judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of
interest which the finder of fact used to reduce the amount of future damages to present
value, or the rate of interest available at the time of trial on one year U.S. Government
Treasury Bills. Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered, the court shall
require a judgment debtor to post security which assures full payment of those damages.
Security for payment of a judgment of p e r i o d i c payments may be in one or more of the
following forms:
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer;
(b) an annuity contract executed b y a qualified insurer;
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurance with one or more
qualified insurers;
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to guarantee payment of the
judgment; or
(e) any other form of security approved by the court.
Security which complies with this section may also serve as a supersedeas bond, where
one is required.
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by periodic payments shall
specify the recipient or recipients of the p a y m e n t s , the dollar amount of the payments,
the interval between payments, and the niltnber of payments or the period of time over which
payments shall be made. Those payments m a y only be modified m the event of the death of
the judgment creditor.
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the assignee of his obligation to
make periodic payments, has failed to m a k e periodic payments as ordered by the court, it
shall, in addition to the required periodic payments, order the judgment debtor or his
assignee to pay the judgment creditor all damages caused by the failure to make payments,
including .court costs and attorney's fees.
(6) The obligation to make periodic p a y m e n t s for all future damages, other than
damages for loss of future earnings, shall cease upon the death of the judgment creditor.
Damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or payments terminated by
reason of the death of the judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the
judgment creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his
death. In that case the court which rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of
any party in interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future
damages in accordance with this section.
(1)
If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3), and approved by a final
judgment entered under this section, the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the
judgment debtor on whose behalf the security is posted shall be discharged.
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice actions against health care
providers which are brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act insofar as they are
applicable; provided, however, that this act shall in no way affect the requirements for
filing notices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts
recoverable under the Utah Governmental Immunity A c t .
78-14-11. Act not retroactive - Exception.
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the provisions relating to the
limitation on the time for commencing an a c t i o n , shall not apply to injuries, death or

e r v i c e s rendered which o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h i s

act.

8-14-12. D i v i s i o n to provide p a n e l - Exemption - Procedures - S t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s
o i l e d - Composition of panel - Expenses - D i v i s i o n a u t h o r i z e d t o s e t l i c e n s e f e e s .
(1) (a) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l p r o v i d e a h e a r i n g p a n e l in a l l e g e d medical l i a b i l i t y c a s e s
gainst health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, except d e n t i s t s .
(b) (i) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l e s t a b l i s h p r o c e d u r e s for p r e l i t i g a t i o n consideration of
e d i c a l l i a b i l i t y claims for damages a r i s i n g out of t h e p r o v i s i o n of or alleged f a i l u r e t o
rovide h e a l t h c a r e .
( i i ) The d i v i s i o n may e s t a b l i s h r u l e s n e c e s s a r y t o a d m i n i s t e r the process and
rocedures r e l a t e d t o p r e l i t i g a t i o n h e a r i n g s and t h e conduct of p r e l i t i g a t i o n hearings in
ccordance with S e c t i o n s 78-14-12 t h r o u g h 7 8 - 1 4 - 1 6 .
(c) The p r o c e e d i n g s a r e i n f o r m a l , n o n b i n d i n g , and a r e n o t s u b j e c t t o T i t l e 63,
hapter 4 6b, A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e s Act, but a r e compulsory a s a c o n d i t i o n precedent t o
ommencing l i t i g a t i o n .
(d) Proceedings conducted u n d e r a u t h o r i t y of t h i s s e c t i o n a r e c o n f i d e n t i a l ,
r i v i l e g e d , and immune from c i v i l p r o c e s s .
(2) (a) The p a r t y i n i t i a t i n g a m e d i c a l l i a b i l i t y a c t i o n s h a l l f i l e a reguest for
r e l i t i g a t i o n panel review w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n w i t h i n 60 days a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of a
t a t u t o r y n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o commence a c t i o n under S e c t i o n 7 8 - 1 4 - 8 .
(b) The r e q u e s t s h a l l i n c l u d e a copy of t h e n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o commence a c t i o n . The
squest s h a l l be mailed t o a l l h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r s named i n t h e n o t i c e and r e q u e s t .
(3) (a) The f i l i n g of a r e q u e s t f o r p r e l i t i g a t i o n p a n e l r e v i e w under t h i s s e c t i o n
o i l s the a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s u n t i l t h e e a r l i e r of 60 days following t h e
i v i s i o n ' s i s s u a n c e of an o p i n i o n by t h e p r e l i t i g a t i o n p a n e l , o r 60 days following t h e
srmination of j u r i s d i c t i o n by t h e d i v i s i o n as p r o v i d e d i n t h i s s u b s e c t i o n . The d i v i s i o n
l a l l send any opinion i s s u e d by t h e p a n e l t o a l l p a r t i e s by r e g u l a r m a i l .
(b) (i) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l complete a p r e l i t i g a t i o n h e a r i n g under t h i s
action w i t h i n 180 days a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e r e q u e s t for p r e l i t i g a t i o n panel review, or
Lthin any longer p e r i o d as a g r e e d upon i n w r i t i n g by a l l p a r t i e s t o the review.
(ii)
If t h e p r e l i t i g a t i o n h e a r i n g has n o t been completed within the time
Lmits e s t a b l i s h e d in S u b s e c t i o n (3) (b) ( i ) , t h e d i v i s i o n has no f u r t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n over
le matter s u b j e c t t o review and t h e c l a i m a n t i s c o n s i d e r e d t o have complied with a l l
Dnditions precedent r e q u i r e d u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n p r i o r t o t h e commencement of l i t i g a t i o n .
(c) (i) The c l a i m a n t and any r e s p o n d e n t may a g r e e by w r i t t e n s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t
:> useful purpose would be s e r v e d by convening a p r e l i t i g a t i o n p a n e l under t h i s s e c t i o n .
( i i ) When t h e s t i p u l a t i o n i s f i l e d with t h e d i v i s i o n , t h e d i v i s i o n s h a l l
Lthin t e n days a f t e r r e c e i p t e n t e r an o r d e r d i v e s t i n g i t s e l f of j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e
Laim, as i t concerns t h e s t i p u l a t i n g r e s p o n d e n t , and s t a t i n g t h a t t h e claimant has
implied with a l l c o n d i t i o n s p r e c e d e n t t o t h e commencement of l i t i g a t i o n regarding t h e
Laim.
(4) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l p r o v i d e f o r and a p p o i n t an a p p r o p r i a t e p a n e l or panels t o hear
>mplaints of medical l i a b i l i t y and damages, made by or on b e h a l f of any p a t i e n t whc i s an
Lleged v i c t i m of medical l i a b i l i t y . The p a n e l s a r e composed of:
(a) one member who i s a r e s i d e n t lawyer c u r r e n t l y l i c e n s e d and in good standing t o
r a c t i c e law in t h i s s t a t e and who s h a l l s e r v e as chairman of t h e p a n e l , who i s appointed
r the d i v i s i o n from among q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l s who have r e g i s t e r e d with the d i v i s i o n
i d i c a t i n g a w i l l i n g n e s s t o s e r v e a s p a n e l members, and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply with t h e
lies of p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct g o v e r n i n g l a w y e r s i n t h e s t a t e of Utah, and who has
>mpleted d i v i s i o n t r a i n i n g r e g a r d i n g conduct of p a n e l h e a r i n g s ;
(b) (i) one member who i s a l i c e n s e d h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r l i s t e d under Section
1-14-3, who i s p r a c t i c i n g and k n o w l e d g e a b l e in t h e same s p e c i a l t y a s the proposed
jfendant, and who i s a p p o i n t e d by t h e d i v i s i o n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Subsection (5); or
( i i ) in claims a g a i n s t o n l y h o s p i t a l s or t h e i r employees, one member who i s an
idividual c u r r e n t l y s e r v i n g i n a h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p o s i t i o n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o
>spital o p e r a t i o n s or conduct t h a t i n c l u d e s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e area of p r a c t i c e t h a t
i the s u b j e c t of the l i a b i l i t y c l a i m , and who i s a p p o i n t e d by t h e d i v i s i o n ; and
(c) a lay p a n e l i s t who i s n o t a l a w y e r , d o c t o r , h o s p i t a l employee, or other h e a l t h
ire p r o v i d e r , and who i s a r e s p o n s i b l e c i t i z e n of t h e s t a t e , s e l e c t e d and appointed by
le d i v i s i o n from among i n d i v i d u a l s who have completed d i v i s i o n t r a i n i n g with r e s p e c t t o
mel h e a r i n g s .
(5) (a) Each person l i s t e d a s a h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r i n S e c t i o n 78-14-3 and
a c t i c i n g under a l i c e n s e i s s u e d by t h e s t a t e , i s o b l i g a t e d a s a c o n d i t i o n of holding
iat l i c e n s e t o p a r t i c i p a t e a s a member of a medical l i a b i l i t y p r e l i t i g a t i o n panel a t
asonable t i m e s , p l a c e s , and i n t e r v a l s , upon i s s u a n c e , with advance n o t i c e given in a

reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order to Participate as a Medical Liability
Prelitigation Panel Member.
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a panel member
upon the division finding participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable burden
or hardship upon the licensee.
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate as a panel
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or justification and without being
excused for cause by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed
$5,000.
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed to appear
and participate as a panel member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or
justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be assessed an
administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5) (c) and (d) shall be deposited in the
Physicians Education Account created in Section 58-67a-l.
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he has no
bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consideration.
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation
and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by rules of the division.
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health care
providers, the division may set license fees of health care providers within the limits
established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation
panels.
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel
except under Section 78-14-16.
78-14-13. Proceedings - Authority of panel - Rights of parties to proceedings.
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evidence, documents, and
exhibits are returned to the parties or witnesses who provided the evidence, documents,
and exhibits at the end of the proceedings upon the request of the parties or witnesses
who provided the evidence.
(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records directly related to the
claim of medical liability in accordance with division rule and in compliance with the
following:
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting party in proper form for
issuance by the division; and
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by:
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting the subpoena attesting to the
fact the medical record subject to subpoena is believed to be directly related to the
medical liability claim to which the subpoena is related; or
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to be provided to the person
requesting the subpoena, signed by the individual who is the subject of the medical record
or by that individual's guardian or conservator.
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and expenses incurred by the panel in the
conduct of prelitigation panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related tc
subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including witness fees and mileage.
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable.
There is no discovery or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special
order of the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
(5) (a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with counsel, and participate in
the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of the
parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to the public.
(b) No party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however,
request special or supplemental participation of some or all parties in particular
respects.
(c) Communications between the panel and the parties, except the testimony of the
parties on the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to all other parties.
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the matter for
panel review as soon as practicable after receipt of a request.
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel.
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel - No judicial or other review.
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 30 days after the end of
the proceedings. The panel shall determine on the basis of the evidence whether each clair

ainst each health care provider has merit or has no merit and, if meritorious, whether
e conduct complained of resulted in harm to the claimant.
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's decision or
commendations.
-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action - Panelist may not
compelled to testify - Immunity of panelist from civil liability - Information
garding professional conduct.
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and its
suits, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence in an
tion subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently filed with
gard to the subject matter of the panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil
ability-arising from participation as a panelist and for all communications, findings,
inions, and conclusions made in the course and scope of duties prescribed by this
stion.
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit the division from
nsidering any information contained in a statutory notice of intent to commence action,
guest for prelitigation panel review, or written findings of a panel with respect to the
/ision's determining whether a licensee engaged in unprofessional or unlawful conduct.
-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement of
rties - Compensation to members of panel.
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a binding
titration hearing and proceed under Title 78, Chapter 31a, except for the selection of
3 panel, which is done as set forth in Subsection 78-14-12(4). If the proceeding is
isidered an arbitration proceeding, the parties are equally responsible for compensation
the members of the panel for services rendered.
-14-17. Arbitration agreements.
(1)
After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a
ilth care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1)
re not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed:
(a)
the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal explanation, the folowing
:ormation on:
(i)
the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the
lim heard by a judge or jury;
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected
ier the agreement;
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any for arbitration-related costs under the
•eement;
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still
:eive health care;
(v)
the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is
iceled in writing before the renewal date; and
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement
;wered; and
(b)
the agreement shall require that:
(i)
one arbitrator shall be collectively selected by all persons claiming damages
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider;
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the
lth care provider from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or
leral courts of Utah;
(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear before a
ring panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider;
(v)
the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 30 days of
ning the agreement; and
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be
omatically renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient
health care provider before the renewal date.
(2)
Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care of any
on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection (5) refused to
er into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care provider.
(3)
A written acknowledgment of having received a written and verbal explanation

of a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a
defense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal explanation of
the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient;
(a)
proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so;
or
(b)
shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was
induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or
fraudulent omission to state material fats.
(4)
The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a
binding arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999.
(5)
A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), except a
person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration
agreement on behalf of a patient.
(6)
This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.

>. Commerce, Occupational and Professional Licensing,
5-78A. Prelitigation Panel Review Rules,
5-78A-1. Title.
These rules are known as the "Prelitigation Panel Review Rules".
5-78A-2. Definitions.
In addition to the definitions in Section 78-14-3, which shall apply to these rules:
(1) "Answer" means a responsive answer to a request.
(2) "Director" means the Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional
snsing.
(3) "Meritorious claim" means that there is a basis in fact and law to conclude
the standard of care has been breached and the petitioner has been injured thereby,
that the petitioner has a reasonable expectation of prevailing at trial.
(4) "Motion" means a request for any action or relief permitted under Sections 78.2 through 78-14-16 or these rules.
(5) "Nonmeritorious claim" means that the evidence before the panel is insufficient
ronclude that the case is meritorious, but does not necessarily mean the case is
r
olous.
(6) "Notice" means a notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8.
(7) "Panel" means the prelitigation panel appointed in accordance with Subsection
4-12(4) to review a request.
(8) "Party" means a petitioner or respondent.
(9) "Person" means any natural person, sole proprietorship, joint venture,
•oration, limited liability company, association, governmental subdivision or agency,
organization of any type.
*(10) "Petitioner" means any person who files a request with the division.
(11) "Pleadings" include the requests, answers, motions, briefs and any other
ments filed by the parties to a request.
(12) "Request" means a request for prelitigation panel review under Section 78-14(13)

"Respondent" means any health care provider named in a request.

-78A-3. Authority - Purpose.
These rules are adopted by the division under the authority of Subsection 78-14)(b) to define, clarify, and establish the process and procedures which govern
itigation panel reviews.
-78A-4. General Provisions.
(1) Liberal Construction.
These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and economical
rmination of all issues presented to the division.
(2) Deviation from Rules.
The division may permit a deviation from these rules insofar as it may find
liance therewith to be impractical or unnecessary.
(3) Computation of Time.
The time within which any act shall be done, as herein provided, shall be computed
xcluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday, Sunday
state holiday, and then it is excluded and the period runs until the end of the next
which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a holiday. When the period of time prescribed
llowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays
1 be excluded in the computation. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do
act within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him
the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three" days shall be added to the
bribed period.

-78A-5. Representations - Appearances.
(1) Representation of Parties.
A party may represent himself individually, or if not an individual, may represent
Lf through an officer or employee, or may be represented by counsel.
(2) Entry of Appearance of Representation.
Parties shall promptly enter their appearances by giving their names and addresses
stating their positions or interests in the proceeding. When possible, appearances
L be entered in writing concurrently with the filing of the request for petitioner and
iter than 10 days from service of the request for respondent.

R156-78A-6. Pleadings.
(1) Docket Number and Title.
Upon receipt of a timely Request for Prelitigation Review, the division shall assign
a two letter code identifying the matter as involving this type of request (PR) , a two
digit code indicating the year the request was filed, a two digit code indicating the
month the request was filed, and another number indicating chronological position among
requests filed during the month. The division shall give the matter a title in
substantially the following form:
TABLE I
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

John Doe,
Petitioner

Request for
P r e l i t i g a t i o n Review

-vsRichard Roe,
Respondent

No. PR-XX-XX-XXX

(2) Form and Content of Pleadings.
"Pleadings must be double-spaced and typewritten and presented on standard 8 1/2" x
11" white paper. They must identify the proceeding by title and docket number, if known,
and shall contain a clear and concise statement of the matter relied upon as a basis for
the pleading, together with an appropriate prayer for relief when relief is sought. A
request shall, by affirmation, set forth the date that the required notice was served,
shall include a copy of the notice and shall reflect service of the request upon all
parties named in the notice and request. When a petitioner fails to attach a copy of the
notice to petitioner's request, the division shall return the request to the petitioner
with a written notice of incomplete request and conditional denial thereof. The notice
shall advise the petitioner that his request is incomplete and that the request is denied
unless the petitioner corrects the deficiency within the time period specified in the
notice and otherwise meets all qualifications to have the request granted.
(3) Signing of Pleadings.
Pleadings shall be signed by the party or their counsel of record and shall indicate
the addresses of the party and, if applicable, their counsel of record. The signature
shall be deemed to be a certification that the signer has read the pleading and that, to
the best of his knowledge and belief, there is good ground to support it.
(4) Answers.
A respondent named in a request may file an answer relative to the merits set forth
in the petitioner's notice. Affirmative defenses shall be separately stated and numbered
in an answer or raised at the time of the hearing. Any answer must be filed no later than
15 days following the filing of the request.
(5) Motions.
(a) Motions to be Filed in Writing.
Motions shall be in writing unless the motion could not have been anticipated prior
to the prelitigation panel hearing.
(b) Time Periods for Filing Motions and Responding Thereto,
(i) Motions to Withdraw a Request.
Any motion to withdraw a request shall be filed no later than five days before the
prelitigation panel hearing.
(ii) Motions Directed Toward a Request.
Any motion directed toward a request shall be filed no later than 15 days after
service of the request.
(iii) Motions Directed Toward the Composition of a Panel.
Any motion directed toward the composition of a panel shall be filed no later than
five days after discovering a basis therefore.
(iv) Motions to Dismiss.
Any motion to dismiss shall be filed no later than five days after discovering a
basis therefore.
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(v) Extraordinary Motions for Discovery o r Perpetuation of Evidence.
Any motion seeking discovery or perpetuation of evidence for good cause shown
Tionstrating extraordinary circumstances shall b e filed n o later than 15 days before the
slitigation panel hearing.
(vi) Response to a Motion.
A response to a motion shall be filed n o later than five days after service of the
tion and any final reply shall be filed n o later than five days after service of the
sponse to the motion.
(c) Affidavits and Memoranda.
The division or panel shall permit and m a y require affidavits and memoranda, or
:h, in support or contravention of a m o t i o n .
(d) The division or panel may permit o r require oral argument on a motion.
56-78A-7. Filing and Service.
(1) Filing of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be filed with the division with
rvice thereof to all parties named in the notice. The division may refuse to accept
ladings if they are not filed in accordance with the requirements of these rules.
(2) Service. Pleadings and documents issued by the division or panel shall be
rved either by personal service or b y first class mail. Personal service shall be made
>n a party in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by any peace officer
:hin the State of Utah or by any person specifically designated by the division. When
attorney has entered an appearance o n behalf of any party, service upon that attorney
istitutes service upon the party so represented.
(3) Proof of Service. There shall appear on all documents required to be served a
rtificate of service in substantially the following form:
TABLE II

I hereby c e r t i f y that I have t h i s day served the foregoing document upon the parties
record in t h i s proceeding set forth below (by d e l i v e r i n g a copy thereof in person ) (by
ling a copy thereof, properly addressed by f i r s t c l a s s mail) :
(Name of p a r t i e s of record)
(addresses)
Dated t h i s (day)

day of (month) , (year) .

(Signature)
(Title)
6-78A-8. Panel Selection and Compensation.
(1) The division shall commence the selection and appointment of panel members
lowing the issuance of a notice of hearing pursuant to these rules.
(2) The selection and appointment of panel members shall.be in accordance with
sections 78-14-12(4) and (5).
(3) (a) In accordance with Subsection 7 8 - 1 4 - 1 2 ( 4 ) , whenever multiple respondents
identified in a request, the division shall select and appoint a panel to sit in
sideration of all claims against any respondent as follows:
(i) one lawyer member who is the chairman in accordance with Subsection 78-144) (a);
(ii) one lay panelist member in accordance with Subsection 78-14-12(4) (c) ;
(iii) one licensed health care provider w h o is practicing and knowledgeable for
h specialty represented by the respondents in accordance with Subsection 78-144)(b)(i); and
(iv) if a hospital or their employees are named as a respondent, one member who is
individual currently serving in a hospital administration position directly related to
pital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the area of practice that
the subject of the liability claim, in accordance with Subsection 78-14-12 (4) (b) (ii) .
(b) The distinction between a hospital administrator and a person serving in a
Dital administration position referenced "in Subsection 78-14-12(4) (b) (ii) is
lificant and is hereby emphasized.
(c) The person serving in a hospital administration position referenced in
section 78-14-12(4)(b)(ii) shall be from a different facility than the facility which
;he subject of the alleged medical liability case, but m a y be from the same umbrella

organization provided the panel member certifies under oath that he is free from bias or
conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consideration as required by
Subsection 78-14-12(6).
(d) Petitioner and respondent may stipulate concerning the type of health care
provider to be selected and appointed by the division, unless the stipulation is in
violation with the panel composition requirements set forth in Subsection 78-14*12(4) (b) .
(4) Upon stipulation of all parties, a motion to evaluate damages may be submitted
to the division whereupon the division may appoint an additional panel member to assist in
evaluating damages.
(5) The division shall ensure that panelists possess all qualifications required by
statute and these rules.
(6) Upon appointment to a prelitigation panel, each member thereof shall sign a
written affirmation in substantially the following form:
TABLE III
I, (panel member), hereby affirm that, as a member of a prelitigation panel, I will
iischarge my responsibilities without bias towards any party. I also affirm that, to the
best of my knowledge, no conflict of interest exists as to any matter which will be
sntrusted to my consideration as a panel member.
Dated this (day) day of (month) , (year) .
(Signature)
(7) Panel members shall be entitled to per diem compensation and travel expenses
according to a schedule as established and published by the division.
R156-78A-9. Action upon Request - Scheduling Procedures - Continuances.
(1) Action upon Request.
Upon receiving a request, the division shall issue an order approving or denying the
request.
(2) Criteria for Approving or Denying a Request.
The criteria for approving or denying a request shall be whether:
(a) the request is timely filed in accordance with Subsection 78-14-12(2) (a);
(b) the request includes a copy of the notice in accordance with Subsection 78-1412(2) (b) ; and
(c) the request has been mailed to all health care providers named in the notice
and request as required by Subsection 78-14-2(2) (b) .
(3) Legal Effect of Denial of Request.
The denial of a request restarts the running of the applicable statute of
limitations until an appropriate request is filed with the division.
(4) Scheduling Procedures.
(a) If a request is approved, the order approving the request shall direct the
party who made the request to contact all parties named in the request and notice to
iqtermine by agreement of the parties:
(i) what type of health care provider panelists are requested;
(ii) at least two dates acceptable to all parties on which a prelitigation panel
hearing may be scheduled; and
(iii) whether or not the case will be submitted in accordance with Section R15678A-13 and if so, the nature of the submission.
(b) The order shall direct the party who made the request to file the scheduling
information with the division, on forms available from the division, no later than 20 days
following the issuance of the order.
(c) If the party so directed fails to comply with the directive without good cause,
the division shall schedule the hearing without further input from the party.
(d) No later than five days following the filing of the approved form, the division
shall issue a notice of hearing setting a date, time and a place for the prelitigation
panel hearing. No hearing shall take place within the 35 day period immediately following
the filing of a Request for Prelitigation Review, unless the parties and the division
consent to a shorter period of time.
(e) The division shall thereafter promptly select and appoint a panel in accordance
with Subsections 78-14-12(4) and (5) and these rules.
(5) Continuances,
(a) Standard.

In o r d e r t o p r e v a i l on a motion for a continuance the moving party must e s t a b l i s h :
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(i) that the motion was filed no later than five days after discovering the
cessity for the motion and at least two days before the scheduled hearing;
(ii) that extraordinary facts and circumstances unknown and uncontrollable by the
rty at the time the hearing date was established justify a continuance;
(iii) that the rights of the other parties, the division, and the panel will not be
fairly prejudiced if the hearing is continued; and
(iv) that a continuance will serve the best interests of the goals and objectives
the prelitigation panel review process.
(b) If a continuance is granted, the order shall direct the party who requested the
ntinuance to contact all parties named in the request and notice to establish no less
an two dates acceptable to all parties, on which the prelitigation panel hearing may be
scheduled.
(c) The order shall direct the party who requested the continuance to file the
tieduling information with the division, on forms approved by the division, no later than
\re days following the issuance of the order.
(d) If a party so directed is the petitioner and the petitioner fails to comply
th the directive without good cause, the division shall dismiss the request without
sjudice. Upon issuance of the order of dismissal by the division, the applicable
atute of limitations on the cause of action shall no longer be tolled. The petitioner
all be required to file another request prior to the scheduling of any further
Dceeding and, until this request is filed, the statute of limitations shall continue to
a.
(e) If a party so directed is the respondent and the respondent fails to comply
th the directive without good cause, the division shall establish a date for the
^litigation panel hearing acceptable to petitioner and disallow any further motions for
itinuances from respondent.
(f) No later than three days following the filing of the dates, the division shall
sue a notice of hearing resetting a date, time and a place for the prelitigation panel
aring.
S6-78A-10. Consequences of Failure to Appear at a Scheduled Hearing.
(1) Except as provided by Section R156-78A-13:
(a) If a party or a representative appointed by the party fails to appear for a
iring without good cause after due notice has been provided as to the scheduling of the
nring, the hearing shall proceed in the party's absence and the party shall lose the
jht to present any further evidence to the panel.
(b) If neither party nor their representatives appear for a hearing without good
ise after due notice has been provided as to the scheduling of the hearing, the division
ill dismiss the request without prejudice. The dismissal shall terminate the tolling of
* applicable statute of limitations under Subsection 78-14-12(3).
>6-78A-ll. Prehearing Procedure.
The division may, upon written notice to all parties of record, schedule a
shearing conference with the panel for the purposes of formulating or simplifying the
sues, obtaining admissions of fact and genuineness of documents which will avoid
lecessary proof, and agreeing to other matters as may expedite the orderly conduct of .
i proceedings or the settlement thereof. Agreements reached during the conference shall
recorded in an appropriate order unless the parties enter into a written stipulation on
i matters or agree to a statement thereof made on the record by the chairman of the
iel.
16-78A-12. Hearing Procedures.
(1) Hearings Closed to the Public.
All hearings are closed to the public.
(2) Attendance of Panel Members.
Except where a case is submitted in written form in accordance with Section R15613, all panel members appointed shall be present during the entire hearing.
(3) Order of Presentation of Evidence.
Unless otherwise directed by the panel at the hearing, the order of procedure and
sentation of evidence will be as follows:
(a) Petitioner;
(b) Re spondent; and
(c) Petitioner, if the panel permits petitioner to present rebuttal evidence.
(4) Method of Presentation of Evidence.
Evidence may be presented by any party on a narrative basis or through direct

examination or said party by their counsel of record. The panel may make inquiry of any
party pertinent to the issues to be addressed. If a motion to evaluate damages has been
granted, the panel may properly take evidence as to that issue. As set forth in Section
78-14-13, no party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however,
request special or supplemental participation of some or all parties in particular
respects, including oral argument, evidentiary rebuttal, or submission of briefs.
(5) Rules of Evidence.
Formal rules of evidence are not applicable. Any relevant evidence may be admitted
if it is the type of evidence commonly relied upon by prudent people in the conduct of
their affairs. The panel shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law.
Irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded.
(6) Burden of Proof.
The petitioner shall be responsible for establishing a meritorious claim against any
respondent, and if the issue of damages is presented, the amount of damages.
(7) Standard of Proof.
The standard of proof for prelitigation hearings is a preponderance of the evidence.
(8) Use of Evidence.

Use of evidence, documents, and e x h i b i t s submitted t o a panel s h a l l be i n accordance
with S u b s e c t i o n 78-14-13(1) and Section 7 8 - 1 4 - 1 4 .
(9) Record of Hearing.
On its own motion, the panel may record the proceeding for the sole purpose of
assisting the panel in its subsequent deliberation and issuance of an opinion. The record
may be made by means of tape recorder or other recording device. No tape recorder or
other device shall be used by anyone otherwise present during the proceeding to record the
matter. Upon issuance by the panel of its opinion, the record of the proceeding shall be
destroyed.
(10) Subpoenas and Fees.
(a) Issuance of Subpoenas.
The division may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production
of medical records in accordance with Subsection 78-14-13(2) and (3). However, except as
permitted by Subsection 78-14-13(2) and (3) and in accordance with Subsection 78-14-13(4),
there is not discovery or perpetuation of testimony in prelitigation panel hearings,
except upon special order of the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating
extraordinary circumstances.
(b) Payment of Witness Fees.
A subpoenaed witness who appears for a prelitigation panel review shall be entitled
to witness fees and mileage to be paid by the requesting party. Witnesses shall receive
the same fee and mileage allowed by law to witnesses in a district court. A witness
subpoenaed by a party may, at the time of service of the subpoena, demand one day's
witness fee and mileage in advance and unless the fee is tendered, the witness shall not
be required to appear.
R156-78A-13. Submission of Case in Written Form, by Proffer, or a Combination thereof Requirements.
(1) A full prelitigation panel hearing is not required if the parties enter into a
stipulation that no useful purpose would be served by convening a panel hearing as to any
or all respondents or if the parties agree to submit their case as to any or all
respondents to the panel in written form, by proffer of evidence, or by a combination
thereof.
(2) Any case submitted in writing must include a legal argument addressing the
relevant evidence and law with regard to the issues presented in the case.
R156-78A-14. Determination - Supplemental Opinion - Certificate of Compliance.
(1) Panel Determination.
As soon as is reasonably practicable following the conclusion of a hearing or
submission of a case to the panel in accordance with Section R156-78A-13, and, if
applicable, submission of briefs by the parties, the panel shall file with the division a
determination whether any claim against any respondent is meritorious. If applicable, the
determination shall also reflect the panel's evaluation of the damages sustained by the
petitioner.
(2) Supplementary Memorandum Opinion.
Within 30 days after filing its determination, the panel shall file a memorandum
opinion explaining the panel's determination. The chairman of the panel shall be
responsible for the preparation of the memorandum opinion of the panel, but may delegate

6

initial preparation of the opinion to another member of the panel.
(3) Certificate of Compliance.
Within 15 days after receiving the panel's memorandum opinion, the director shall
le a certificate of compliance which recites that petitioner has fully complied with
requirements of Section 78-14-12. With respect to the tolling of the statute of
stations referenced in Section 78-14-12(3), the 60 day time period mentioned therein
L1 begin to run as of the date the Director causes the certificate of compliance to be
red, the three day mailing period set forth in Section R156-78A-4 (3) to be applied.
: medical malpractice, prelitigation*
active May 16, 1997
Lee of Continuation September 16, 1997

78-14-12(1) (b)

